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abstract
Translation is analyzed from the standpoint of its systemic properties. Translation is 
shown to have the capacity to observe itself and its difference from the environment. 
Observation being a major autopoietic factor, translation may be considered as an 
autopoietic system. Doubts about this hypothesis arise because of the peculiarities of 
communicative properties of translation. Translation plays the role of the mediating 
party in complex translation communication events and its communicative behavior 
is ‘defective’ in that translation does not act upon source messages because its com-
municative function is passing messages on to the target party. As a system, transla-
tion may be studied against the background of its environment and be compared 
with other social systems. It may also be viewed as a subsystem within larger social 
formations. Although, as a mediator by nature, translation thrives on structural cou-
plings and interpenetrations with other systems, thereby manifesting its exceptional 
interactional openness, it nonetheless constitutes an operational closure with its own 
first- and second-order observations. 
résumé
Dans cette article, la traduction est analysée du point de vue de ses propriétés systé-
miques. La traduction a la capacité de s’observer et d’observer sa différence par rap-
port à l’environnement. Etant donné que l’observation est un facteur autopoïétique 
majeur, la traduction peut donc être considérée comme un système autopoïétique. 
Les doutes concernant cette hypothèse peuvent être attribués aux particularités des 
propriétés communicatives de la traduction. La traduction joue le rôle de médiatrice, 
ou de partie médiatrice, dans une communication traductive aux manifestations com-
plexes et son comportement communicatif est « défectueux » dans la mesure où elle 
n’agit pas sur les messages source, sa fonction communicative étant de faire passer les 
messages à la partie cible. En tant que système, la traduction peut être étudiée dans 
le cadre de son environnement et comparée à d’autres systèmes sociaux. Elle peut 
être également envisagée comme un sous-système à l’intérieur de formations sociales 
plus larges. Bien que la traduction, soit-elle médiatrice par nature, soit portée par 
des couplages structurels et des interpénétrations avec d’autres systèmes, manifestant 
de ce fait son exceptionnelle ouverture interactionnelle, elle constitue une fermeture 
opérationnelle face à ses propres observations de premier et second ordre. 
keywords
Niklas Luhmann. Social systems theory. Autopoiesis. Sociology of translation.
mots-clés
Niklas Luhmann. Théorie des systèmes sociaux. Autopoïèse. Sociologie de la traduction.
The decisive question is whether, and in what 
ways, other autopoietic systems, endowed with 
their own autonomy and their own operative1 clo-
sure, can emerge within the autopoietic system of 
society […]
Niklas Luhmann (2000a: 135)
1. Introduction
For more than a decade, a specter of Luhmann’s social systems theory (SST) 
has been haunting Translation Studies (TS). After having made a sociological 
turn, or rather, one may argue, a turn towards sociology, TS seems to have 
got cold feet and, acting like a collectively conscious Hamlet, is pondering 
over Hamlet’s existential dilemma: To be or not to be, i.e., to continue or 
not to continue? Translation students seem to share sociologists’ doubts: Is 
it worth reading a couple of hundred arid, if not obfuscating, pages before 
one starts to understand anything, and who knows, what you can actually get 
out of this dense theory for your own research (Seidl and Becker 2005: 10, 
Sosoe 2001: xiv-xv)? This is how conscience makes us, as it made Hamlet, if 
for a moment, too cowardly and the native hue of resolution is sicklied over 
with the pale cast of thought and loses the name of action. As a result, apart 
from Andreas Poltermann’s (1992) and Theo Hermans’s (1997, 1999, 2007a, 
2007b) attempts to apply Luhmann’s SST to studying translation, not much 
has been done to continue and develop their initiatives, although the specter 
is still there, lurking, waiting to pounce.
TS turns out to be no exception to the rule, formulated by Jean Paul and 
quoted by Luhmann in one of his articles: “[I]n the realm of knowledge—dif-
ferent from the physical realm—sound always arrives earlier than light” (Seidl 
and Becker 2005: 54). The words ‘social systems theory’ and ‘autopoiesis’ are 
1.  In my own text below, I prefer the term ‘operational’ to the term ‘operative’ as well as the 
term ‘functional (sub)system’ to ‘function (sub)system’. Yet, I leave the terms ‘operative’ 
and ‘function (sub)system’ in citations, treating them as interchangeable
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familiar but discussions of them hardly go beyond what one reads in Her-
mans’s works. Possibility of the application of Luhmann’s ideas to the study of 
translation is still explored only superficially. In fact, translation students are 
not at all convinced if these allegedly antihumanist ideas (Moeller 2006: ix; 
Horster 1992: 10) are of any relevance at all when the crusade for translator, 
not text (of translation) is declared (Pym, Shlesinger and Jettmarová 2003: 2).
Systemic study of translation may be traced back to the Tel-Aviv–Leuven 
school which developed ideas of the Russian formalists who viewed national 
literature as a polysystem with its evolutionary dynamics and centre/periph-
ery relations (Tynianov 1977: 255-81, Even-Zohar 1990). Translation was, 
however, primarily studied within a national literary system (or, in the exact 
terminology, “polysystem” since the literary system was seen as composed of 
a number of systems). Yet the literary system is but one social system amongst 
many others where translation is as actively practiced. No wonder, a broader 
social perspective of translational practice started to come into view of trans-
lation scholars and the role played by translation was considered not only 
within the national literary system, but in the overall social system (Tyulenev 
2009: 156-8).
My aim in the present paper is to follow such broader view of social in-
volvements of translation and to take the discussion of the applicability of 
SST to research in sociologically informed TS a step further. I will also prob-
lematize the epistemology of putting translator as the declared focus of schol-
arly efforts in TS. 
2. Why luhmann?
If there is no place like our present homelessness 
away from home, then it is Luhmann who can best 
guide us in this ever-expanding wilderness.
William Rasch (2000: 3)
Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998) is reputed to have been one of the leading so-
ciologists of the twentieth century. His legacy is, amongst other things, in 
that he suggested a new way of describing not only modern society but also 
modernity itself. He courageously faced the growing rationalization and plu-
ralization of our “disenchanted” world, picking up where Max Weber left 
(Rasch 2000: 2). This is where Luhmann and another giant figure of modern 
sociological thought, Jürgen Habermas, are drastically different. In contrast 
to Habermas, Luhmann does not hope to regain the lost unity of reason and, 
ultimately, the world. “Rather, in Weberian fashion, Luhmann participates 
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in the operations and mitosis-like self-divisions of modern rationality by de-
scribing how those operations function” (ibid.: 11). 
Habermas’s mission is to find a unifying basis for the world which has 
had a great fall but which might, allegedly, be put together again; Luhmann 
paints a warts-and-all portrait of the de-centered and demystified world of 
modernity. In his SST, Luhmann presents the world as a multitude of equally 
unequal systems. Specifically, he is interested in self-(re)producing, or au-
topoietic, systems. Being a sociologist, he is primarily concerned with social 
systems, communication-based self-reproducing systems. 
Throughout history, there have been different types of social systems’ 
self-organization. According to Luhmann, the following four such types may 
be singled out: segmentary differentiation (the system is composed of nearly 
identical self-sufficient subsystems); center/periphery differentiation; strati-
fied (rank-based) differentiation; and functional differentiation of modern 
society (1998: 595-776; cf. Habermas 1989: 114, where the fundamental dif-
ference between segmentally and functionally differentiated societies is traced 
back to Durkheim). The last function-based type of social-systemic organiza-
tion is exactly the Weberian rationalized and pluralized world of modernity. 
Although the leading social philosophers agree with such a vision of modern 
society, the difference between them, best exemplified by the controversy be-
tween Habermas and Luhmann, is in how they answer the questions: Is the 
social reality ‘out of joint’? and Shall we accept it as it is or try and change it 
to make it somehow better? (Bausch 2001: 61-7, 95-153) It should be noted, 
however, that to change the world of rationalization and pluralization may 
mean to do away with rationalization and pluralization and this is “in no way 
desirable” (Odo Marquard, quoted in Rasch 2000: 2). It is also quite possible 
that the programs of changing modernity into a post-modernity are no more 
than an anti-modernist and au fond pluralist slogan which “affirms an old 
and respectable modernist motif, for the modern world was always and still 
is rationalization and pluralization” (Marquard, ibid.). In the midst of this 
controversy and at least, optimistically (or naively?) speaking, until a consen-
sus is reached, Luhmann, contemplating the reality with an unblinking eye, 
seems to be the best Virgil or Beatrice for us, depending on how we see the 
world—as Inferno or Paradiso. Let us follow him.
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3. autopoiesis and Self-organization
3.1. Key Concepts of SST
Social systems are defined as systems, which produce themselves qua systems. 
This circular self-reproduction is called autopoiesis (from Greek auto—self, 
and poiein—to produce). Elements of allopoietic systems are supplied from 
outside, from the system’s environment; autopoietic systems produce their 
elements themselves out of themselves and thereby constitute operational 
closures because no outside operation can penetrate them. Autopoietic sys-
tems are however interactionally open. They utilize energy and information 
of their environment (Luhmann 1995: 118, Schrödinger 1968, Foerster 1981: 
2-22). In SST, interactions of the system with its environment are referred to 
as structural couplings. 
On the level of its operations, the autopoietic system does not receive any 
inputs from the environment but only perturbations (or “irritations”), which 
then might trigger internal operations in the system. In other words, external 
events may trigger internal processes but cannot determine those processes. 
In this respect, Luhmann speaks of a “trigger-causality” [Auslösekausalität] 
instead of an “effect-causality” [Durchgriffskausalität]. (Seidl and Becker 
2005: 23.)
Internally, autopoietic systems reproduce themselves by virtue of a particular 
structural mechanism—their self-organization. Self-organization, that is, the 
system’s makeup, structures of which the autopoietic system is composed, is 
a result of the system’s internal operations: the system’s organization is “an 
interrelated network of components and component-producing processes” 
(Csanyi and Kampis, quoted in Bausch 2001: 32). Yet, the system evolves by 
growing in complexity as it observes and makes sense of its complex environ-
ment. Following George Spencer Brown (1969; see also Baecker 1999: 4-5), 
Luhmann interprets the term “observation” at its highest level of abstraction 
(1995: 36, 506). Observation is not reduced to its optical manifestation but is 
defined as any operation that is based on distinguishing between phenomena, 
e.g., in terms of their being intrinsic or extrinsic in relation to the observed 
system. Such observation may pose “reference problems,” i.e., obstacles jeop-
ardizing communication, which are to be resolved. This leads to diagnos-
ing new needs of the system that necessitate creating new functions and re-
spective functional subsystems which focus on resolving identified problems 
(Luhmann 2000a: 138). 
Thus, there are two principal features of autopoietic systems: autopoiesis, 
(re)production of the system’s units, and the system’s self-organization, its 
self-(re)structuring. The emphasis on autopoiesis and self-organization of the 
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system is laid because doubts, whether translation is a communication system 
or not, boil down to these two fundamental characteristics of the system. 
3.2. Ephemerality of Translation and Its Inferior Social Status 
Sparseness of the translation “mediation space” as compared to other social 
systemic phenomena casts doubts about systemic properties of translation (cf. 
in Bourdieusian terms in Wolf 2007: 110). Yet, ephemerality of translation as 
a systemic formation is hardly a criterion for deciding whether translational 
phenomena form a system or not. In fact, in communication systems theory, 
communication events are conceived of as fleeting phenomena disappearing 
as soon as they appear (Luhmann 1995: 49). Yet, this does not decrease their 
ability to self-organize as systems.
Social status of translation is also brought up as a reason why translation 
could not be viewed as a social systemic phenomenon (see an overview in 
Wolf 2007: 114-7). However, neither translators’ submissiveness and their 
invisibility in society, nor social ‘marginality’ of the translator’s profession or 
the lack of its institutionalization; nor the fact that translators’ products are 
the result of interplay of a number of disparate factors, that they are incapable 
of forming their own space, submitting to the target cultural space—neither 
of these hold up as impregnable arguments. Translation can be considered as 
a social systemic phenomenon based on its nature, which is mediation.
3.3. ‘Dehumanization’
Another reason for denying that translation has a status of communication 
system is that the latter is defined in SST as composed of communication 
events—not of human beings. The essence of this reason, however, is not so 
much a denial of systemic properties of translation, as a misconstruction of 
Luhmann’s attempt to keep apart psychology and sociology and is a residue 
of the centuries-long humanist tradition in the humanities. It is important to 
understand that human beings, translators and interpreters, are not dispensed 
with; they constitute an important part of the environment for translation qua 
communication system. Luhmann states:
If one views human beings as part of the environment of society (instead 
of as part of society itself), this changes the premises of all the traditional 
questions, including those of classical humanism. It does not mean that the 
human being is estimated as less important than traditionally. Anyone who 
thinks so (and such an understanding either explicitly or implicitly underlies 
all polemics against this proposal) has not understood the paradigm change 
in systems theory (1995: 212).
352 Sergey Tyulenev
No communication, including translation, would be possible in the society 
without physical and psychic systems (ibid.: 210-5). 
What Luhmann suggests is a better focus: the social realm is what is com-
municated and made socially ‘visible’. Thoughts, for instance, are not socially 
visible and should be studied in psychology. Translation as a socially ‘visible’ 
phenomenon cannot exist without the psychic systems. The term translator, 
however, lacks precision. The translator is a combination of three types of sys-
tems: physiological, psychic and social. Socially relevant translation research 
focuses on social facts, whereas psychology concentrates on intra-human 
phenomena. This does not exclude interdisciplinary studies, but requires a 
conscious interdisciplinary effort—not confusion because the student does 
not know better. By these lights, the terms such as human being, translator, 
turn out to be too fuzzy and necessitate further precision with regards to the 
three types of systems involved. Luhmann’s SST provides us with the tools to 
handle this kind of challenges.
3.4. Translation Communication Event and the Nature of Translation
Autopoiesis of translation is ensured by the recursively reproduced nature 
of translation manifested in translational communication event (TCE). TCE 
is a special case of communication events. Despite their staggering variety 
through different human communities and different historical periods, TCEs 
have intrinsically invariable characteristics. It is this fact—existence of trans-
lation as a specific type of communication—that serves as the autopoietic 
guarantee of translation as a communication system. From the standpoint of 
this fundamental criterion, all communication events are either translations 
or not. Translation exists not because there are people who engage in transla-
tion or want to study those who engage in translation practice; rather, there 
is a social function fulfilled by a certain type of communication. This com-
munication activity fulfills a specific function by virtue of being what it is. Its 
raison d’être is to fulfill this particular social function. Properties of translation 
allow it to be “differentiated according to a specific threshold problem” and to 
make what is improbable probable and realizable (Luhmann 1986: 20-1; also 
Luhmann 2000a: 138). Translation increases the likelihood of intrasystemic 
communication and intersystemic interaction. As to human beings participat-
ing in TCE, they exercise only the trigger-causality on the translation system.
As far as the self-organization of translation is concerned, an important 
question is: What is included into the translation system—only translational 
acts or translational acts plus the initial and final communications. Put dif-
ferently, since TCE brings together three parties A, B, and C, where A and C 
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are source and target of communication and B is a translating agent, what 
should be included into the translation communication system: only B or all 
the three?2 
To answer this question, it is important to understand that TCE is com-
posed of two communication events (CEs). Each of the two CEs consists 
of three parts (selections)—utterance, information and understanding (Luh-
mann 1995: 139-44). CE1 occurs between A and B (the source and translation):
CE1 [A: Utterance1>Information1@B: Understanding1].
Utterance is everything that is communicated by A. Information is only the 
communicative core of utterance. The information in CE1 contains what A 
wants to be understood. Yet, rules governing semiosis force A to add other 
features to this communicative core; A expects the other communicating 
party to extract the communicative core from its semiotic packaging. That is 
why in the formula above, the initial utterance is shown to be ‘larger’ than its 
information. The final element of this communication is B’s understanding. 
Inevitably, B’s understanding is but an inference. Understanding is always 
conjectural and interpretative. This is why in the formula, I show the 
equivalence between A’s information and B’s understanding as approximate.
CE2 unfolds between B and C: 
CE2 [B: Utterance2>Information2@C: Understanding2].
The above description of CE1 is mutatis mutandis applicable to CE2. 
In reality, the complexity of TCE is due to the fact that what we theoreti-
cally slice above into two separate formulae is spliced:
TCE: [A: Utterance1>Information1@B: (Understanding1=
Utterance2)>Information2@C: Understanding2].
Although TCEs are complex events with two distinguishable CEs, CE1 is 
communication-wise ‘defective’. Normally, CE strives to reach a goal—to es-
tablish/reinforce communication. This is not so as regards CE1. Understand-
ing1 is reached but it is not acted upon. The translating agent (B) understands 
2.  In the process of communication, both A and C become both source and target in turns. 
In the following discussion, for simplicity’s sake, I will limit myself to only one direction 
of communication: A→(B)→C.
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in order to pass its understanding to the other end of the communication 
chain. The translating agent mediates between communicating parties proper. 
Neither A nor C expect the full participation of B in the communication. Yet, 
the realization of dependency of the communication between A and C on B 
is there. The fuller translation manifests itself as a social subsystem, the fuller 
the system or interacting (sub)systems recognize translation as a factor to take 
into consideration. A and C exercise trigger-causality on TCE. TCE, however, 
cannot be generated without A and C and therefore the entire TCE should be 
considered as the unit of the translation system. In his book on mass media, 
Luhmann argues that, although with mass media, “no interaction […] can 
take place between sender and receivers” because of the interposition of tech-
nology, reception should be included into the communicational unit, because
[c]ommunication only comes about when someone watches, listens, reads—
and understands to the extent that further communication could follow on. 
The mere act of uttering something, then, does not, in and of itself, con-
stitute communication. On the other hand, it is difficult in the case of the 
mass media (in contrast to interaction that occurs among those co-present) 
to determine the target group involved in each instance. To a large extent, 
therefore, obvious presence has to be substituted by assumptions. This is 
especially true if the process of turning comprehension/mis-comprehension 
into further communication within or outside the system of the mass media 
is also to be taken into account. (2000b: 2, 4)
In translation also, communication requires the mediated parties. Commu-
nication is also a recursive looping of one TCE on another. Therefore, al-
though translation does not communicate with the mediated parties in the 
sense of acting upon the parties’ utterances, it would be logical to consider the 
operational boundary of the translation system as drawn by the entire TCE 
(A+B+C).
Intuitively, we feel that communication properties of translation as a 
mediator of communication are somehow different from communication 
properties of communicating parties proper. This intuitive feeling makes us 
think twice before categorizing translation as a communication system. Even 
when we do categorize translation as a communication system, we provide 
a caveat; for example, that translation may be described as a system within 
the constructionist paradigm (Hermans 2007a; 2007b). However, first of all, 
constructionism is inevitable to a lesser or greater degree (Weinberg 2009). 
Constructionism also helps discover new properties of studied phenomena 
and not only deploy a new conceptual apparatus. Constructionistically stud-
ied phenomena are not figments of imagination. If translation can be de-
scribed as a system, it means translation is a system from a certain viewpoint. 
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Translation, then, is shown to be a system not only as a result of an episte-
mological exercise, but also in the ontological sense. If translation were not a 
system, it would be impossible to construct translation as a system. One can-
not describe the frog as the mermaid because it is not the mermaid, but one 
can describe the frog as many things it is: a living organism, an amphibian, 
or a biological system. Saying that translation is a system does not exclude 
other possible ways of constructing translation; just as saying that the frog is 
an amphibian does not exclude the possibility of describing it as a biological 
system or an animal. That is why Luhmann opened his major book on social 
systems as follows: 
The following considerations assume that there are systems. Thus they do 
not begin with epistemological doubt. They also do not advocate a “purely 
analytical relevance” for systems theory. The most narrow interpretation of 
systems theory as a mere method of analyzing reality is deliberately avoided. 
Of course, one must never confuse statements with their objects; one must 
realize that statements are only statements and that scientific statements are 
only scientific statements. But, at least in systems theory, they refer to the 
real world. Thus the concept of system refers to something that is in reality a 
system and thereby incurs the responsibility of testing its statements against 
reality (1995: 12).
To conclude this section, neither ephemerality of translation, nor its social sta-
tus, nor its structural complexity and peculiarity of its communication prop-
erties prevent us from claiming that translation is a communication system.
4. levels of observation 
To understand functioning of social systems and their subsystems, it is helpful 
to consider certain details of the concept of observation. Observing implies 
marking, or distinguishing one thing from another, for example differentiating 
between what belongs to the observing agent and what is alien to it (Spencer 
Brown 1969). Based on this distinction, some observed phenomena gain the 
status of ‘marked’ (intrinsic) as opposed to others—‘unmarked’ (extrinsic). 
Applied to the autopoietic system, some of the phenomena are considered to 
be part and parcel of the system’s communication whereas others—part of the 
system’s environment. In other words, some (‘marked’) phenomena are inside 
the system and are the system; the others (‘unmarked’) are outside the system 
and constitute the environment. The system observes constantly by distin-
guishing between itself as the ‘marked’ domain and the ‘unmarked’ environ-
ment. Autopoietic systems are, therefore, observing systems (Foerster 1981). 
The system also reenters the division of phenomena as ‘marked’ and ‘un-
marked’ into itself (Luhmann 1999: 17). As a result, its ‘marked’ homogeneity 
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is heterogenized. Over the course of history, social systems were heteroge-
nized differently depending on what criteria were applied to their marked ‘in-
side’: segmentation of the society into identical (tribe-like) formations; rank-
based stratification (classes, castes); territorial differentiation into center and 
periphery (the capital and provinces with respective political, economical, 
and cultural statuses); formation of functionally different subsystems (law, 
economy, art). All these difference schemata define different ways of how the 
system is divided into subsystems. Intrasystemically, the ‘marked’ state is jux-
taposed with other ‘marked’ states. On the scale of the entire social system, 
these are subsystems and their respective relations are described as ‘subsys-
tem vs. subsystem’; for each other, these subsystems are systems and, there-
fore, their relations are ‘system vs. system’.
When dealing with system/environment relations, the system constitutes the 
internal [marked] side of the form, whereas the environment is its unmarked 
space. “The environment” is nothing else but an empty correlate of the sys-
tem’s self-reference; it provides no information. If, however, we are dealing 
with system/system relations [within an overall social system], then the other 
side can be marked and indicated. In this case [on the intrasystemic scale], 
art no longer deals with ‘everything else’ but with questions such as whether 
and to what extent the artist is motivated by political convenience or by 
wealthy customers (Luhmann 2000a: 135).
Thus, we see two levels of observation: ‘system vs. environment’ and ‘system 
vs. system’.
In the latter case, (sub)systems form environment for each other but this 
environment is “marked and indicated,” that is, it does provide information 
unlike the environment in the system/environment relations. Additionally, 
another level of observation—‘system vs. subsystem’—is also to be consid-
ered if translation is to be studied in its societal involvements.
When we apply these different types of relations to translation, we see 
the following possibilities. Translation can be viewed as a subsystem within 
a system. To describe translation from this standpoint, one has to define the 
place it occupies in the overall social system and address the problem of its 
being ‘diffused’ amongst other subsystems. 
When translation is studied as a subsystem in relation to other subsys-
tems, the problem, if the translation subsystem is of equal status in the so-
ciety with law, economy, art and the like or if it is somehow subordinate to 
these functional subsystems of the modern society, must be addressed. This 
scale of the observation is ‘system vs. system’. The related question: What was 
the social place of translation before the modern function-based social sys-
tems assumed their present-day shape? — would be of a historical/diachronic 
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nature. For example, what was the social place of translation in the society 
of segmentary differentiation? To characterize the social role of translation 
within non-function-based societies would require theory of these societies. 
Luhmann’s SST is focused on modern society. Therefore, I do not discuss the 
role of translation in other types of societies.
 Finally, translation may be described as an autopoietic system distin-
guished from all other, autopoietic or allopoietic, systems without privileging 
its social characteristics. In this case, translation may be juxtaposed with any 
other type of autopoietic systems: for example, with legal or military opera-
tional closures, with biological or psychic autopoieses, etc. Translation may 
also be compared with allopoietic systems provided such a procedure is found 
worth an effort. This scale of observation is ‘system vs. environment’. 
5. System / environment
5.1. Could translation be described as a system?
In the following three sections, I will consider translation from these different 
angles of observation and I will start with the last listed above because it is 
logical to start at the most fundamental level. 
Translation seems to be too diffused in the society to form a distinct entity 
of the systemic status. This raises doubts if translation might be viewed as a 
systemic phenomenon. Linguistic categorization of certain types of activity as 
translation does not qualify as a full-blown proof that such types of activity 
are a system, an assemblage of interrelated and interacting units, let alone an 
autopoietic system.
We have seen that translation observes its distinction as an activity with 
its specific nature. It is by virtue of this nature that translation sets itself apart 
from any other type of activity. Moreover, this distinct nature of translation 
unfolds recursively over time and space, creating a memory of translation 
which is based on prior translational operations anticipating future transla-
tional operations. Thus, translation marks certain phenomena as belonging 
to itself and being itself rejecting all other, alien, phenomena. This process of 
observation creates an operational closure, which locks translation operations 
on themselves. This systemic circularity acquires an autopoiesis of its own be-
cause nothing else can operationally influence its distinct nature. All external 
influences exercise only trigger-causality on it. In this sense, translation is not 
like a conveyor which functions operationally as a system only as long as it is 
activated from outside. 
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As to translation’s self-organization, the question is bound to arise: What 
is the structure of translation as a system? What are the elements that consti-
tute it? To understand this, one has to see that translation is characterized by 
its social involvements and participates in social communication. Therefore, 
translation must belong to the category of social systems. As a social system, 
translation consists of communication events, but of a specific kind. These 
specific communication events are mediatory in that they involve mediation. 
As we have seen, translation involves at least three parties: A, B, and C, where 
A and C could not communicate without B. B mediates between A and C. 
Thus, the translation communication act is composed of the mediated part 
and the mediating part. Yet, strictly speaking, the element of the translation 
system is the section from Understanding1 to Information2, the ‘B’ part in the 
following formula (highlighted in bold):
A: Utterance1>Information1@B: (understanding1=utterance2)>
Information2@C: Understanding2.
Utterance1 and Information1 are supplied from the environment; Understand-
ing2 is the result of the operation of the translation system. The boundary 
of the translation system is drawn by the operation of the transformation 
A→B→C. Luisi (1993: 24) supplies us with an example from the realm of bi-
ology. A minimal autopoietic system has a boundary and content composed of 
at least one component, B. One component (metabolite) A enters the system 
and a process A→B occurs in the system. This is the system’s self-generating 
reaction which produces the system’s element B necessary for the intrasystem-
ic processes. Another type of reaction occurring within the system is B→C. 
This is a process resulting from the system’s internal operations. The opera-
tional processes producing elements are determined by the bounded system 
and take place only inside this boundary. Thus, the system produces its own 
elements as a result of its own operations. The metabolite A can enter the sys-
tem only thanks to the system’s interactional openness, yet no other system 
could handle A in the same fashion. This cannot fail to remind us of TCE: 
the party A’s utterance is handled in a specific way—communication-wise de-
ficient and intended for passing on—by the party B. The party B transforms 
the utterance of the party A so as to make this utterance communicable to 
the party C. Again, no other system could do the same. Just as the element B 
in Luisi’s example, which makes the chain A→B→C possible, is found only 
within the system B, translation communication event is generated only with-
in the translation system. 
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Neither sending nor reception, if we prefer this terminology (criticized, 
however, in Luhmann 1995: 139), should be included into the translation 
system. The latter’s boundary cuts them off. Utterance1, Information1 and Un-
derstanding2 are the mediated part of the translation communication event 
(TCE). Only the mediating (B) part belongs to the translation system. How-
ever, it should be taken into account that the nature of mediation requires 
considering the mediated parties. Such ‘keeping an eye on the other side’ of 
the marked state is typical of many observing systems, especially of those us-
ing meaning in constructing reality (Luhmann 2000a: 61, Rasch 2000: 175). 
That is why not infrequently, studying/analyzing TCE involves comparing the 
mediating (B) party with either or both of the mediated (A, C) parties. Yet, 
the mediated parties of TCE exercise only a trigger-causality on the mediating 
party. The mediated parties cannot translate; they can only voice their recom-
mendations, preferences or warnings. Incidentally, thanks to this operational 
independence of translation, such trends as Skopostheorie, Translatorisches 
Handeln or radical types of feminist translation become thinkable and practi-
cable. The mediated parties cannot penetrate the intrinsic operational closure 
of the translation system whose operational nature is to infer the information 
of the source utterance, re-utter it in another medium, inevitably endowing 
the resulting utterance with the information, which approximates the infor-
mation of the source utterance, and pass the new utterance on for the final 
inferential understanding. 
Elements of any system are characterized by attributes. Attributes of 
translation communication system’s elements, that is, translational-mediatory 
mechanisms, are different depending on the type of semiosis that uses media-
tion. In the verbal semiosis, elements are described in terms of their linguistic 
properties, textual characteristics, size of concrete mediated/mediating units, 
the volume of mediating transactions per unit of time, etc. In the non-verbal 
semiosis, other attributes, characteristic of the involved media and specifici-
ties of their interaction, will be introduced. 
Elements also have relations between themselves. Some relations are in-
ert; some are active. Actively related elements of the translation system form 
thematic groups or subsystems (medical, economic, literary translation). 
There may be further subdivisions within these thematic groups: for example, 
different genres of literary translations. 
As has been conclusively shown by the Russian formalists and by scholars 
of the Tel-Aviv–Leuven school, elements of the translation system enter rela-
tions with elements of other systems. For example, literary translations de-
velop relations with literary system’s elements. Translation also connects with 
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other systems, for example, with the political one, when translations take part 
in establishing or reinforcing idiolegemes (Brisset 1996).
5.2. Translation as a system: allopoietic or autopoietic?
If we agree that translation can be described as a system, the question of what 
kind of system it is—allo- or autopoietic—needs to be further elaborated on. 
Allopoietic systems rely on inputs from outside sources for their functioning. 
Autopoietic systems function out of themselves. Computer programs or as-
semblage lines are designed to perform certain functions and cannot repro-
duce themselves. Living cells perform certain functions, too, but they repro-
duce themselves. 
Translation is an autopoietic system because translational operations 
reproduce themselves drawing on prior translational operations and antici-
pating future translational operations. Like any communication element, 
the translation system’s elements are short-lived (if not preserved in a more 
durable medium). As communication elements interconnect to form a com-
munication system, the translation system’s elements interconnect to form 
their own system. Like any communication system, the translation system 
“is of course not a space which disappears without leaving a trace,” as is 
rightly stated in Wolf (2007: 117). On the contrary, the translation system is a 
“mediation space” with “numerous continuities or tradition lines,” which “is 
built up through new connections” (ibid.: 118). This is the way autopoietic 
observations function: 
We speak of observations only when the indication of one side of a distinc-
tion [e.g., translation vs. non-translation] is motivated by recursive intercon-
nections—partly by prior observations, hence memory, and partly through 
connectivity, that is, by anticipating what one can do with the distinction 
[…]. (Luhmann 2000a: 59) 
One may question the translation system’s autopoiesis based on the fact that 
the translation exists as long as other communication events are fed into it. 
Indeed, does this mean that translation as a system is allopoietic? The answer 
is an emphatic ‘no’. Taking energy and information from the environment 
does not turn autopoiesis into allopoiesis. Autopoietic systems have their own 
operational closure; incoming energy and information play the role of trigger-
causality and not effect-causality. In other words, despite the fact that there is 
an input from the outside (the mediated component of the translation com-
munication event), translation keeps its operational closure intact. The medi-
ated part only triggers a translation event but does not define its nature. At the 
same time, as there is no system without environment, there is no translation 
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with only the mediating component; even if the mediated component does 
not exist, it is still implied/referred to, albeit in reality the reference may be 
equal to ‘zero’ (cf. pseudo-translations). 
To sum up, Gail R. Fleischaker formulated the following three basic ques-
tions which are to be positively answered before one can regard an entity as 
autopoietic (cited in Luisi 1993: 21):
(1) Is the system self-bounded?
(2) Is the system self-generating?
(3) Is the system self-perpetuating?
As has been shown above, in the TCE chain A→B→C neither A nor C oper-
ate in the fashion B does and it is this part B that is translation per se. Part B 
stands apart in terms of its operations and therefore it is self-bounded. Part B 
viewed as a bounded zone generates its own elements and therefore it is self-
generating. In its recursive reproduction, it perpetuates itself. Thus, based on 
these criteria, translation can be said to be an autopoietic system.
5.3. Mediation vs. Exchange
The difference schema of translation as a system—mediation—should be kept 
apart from exchange. Exchange is a direct juxtaposition of one item with 
another and is, thus, a two-part interaction; whereas mediation is an indirect 
juxtaposition and a three-part interaction. In the situation when somebody 
explains a word or notion to another person thereby, in Roman Jakobson’s 
terms, translating intralingually, A (source) is equal to B (mediator): the first 
person uses a word/notion and explains it (re-wording). Yet, there are still 
three parties in the communication: source—mediator—target.
5.4. Actors and activity
In section 5.3, we have seen that the same communicant may play different 
parts. In real life, the translator may play even more social roles: s/he may 
be a translator/interpreter, the editor, the commissioner (for instance, when 
somebody translates a literary work for his/her own interest or on his/her own 
initiative). 
Translation as an activity is fully autopoietic in that it depends on its na-
ture for its unfolding, not on actors. Actors are social beings and their actions 
are prompted by a society or one of its subsystems. Even if translators are 
reluctant to mediate something as required by one system (e.g., by political 
power), they automatically comply with another system (aesthetic or another 
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political force in the society or they express their own views, thus going be-
yond translation as mediation). In this sense, translation is not dependent on 
its actors: translation depends on itself as an activity with difference schema 
(mediation) practiced in and for a society (or rather, one of its ever competing 
parts). This is why the translator cannot be put in the centre of sociologically 
informed TS. This is why particular translators’ decisions can and should be 
explained from the viewpoint of the nature of translation: what parties are 
mediated and how the mediation unfolds. To do a research on a translator 
or a translation product is to show what translation laws are applicable in 
this or that particular situation. The social action is always predetermined 
by the set of available choices, although the actor is free to choose amongst 
the offered options. The choice of the actor is an interplay of physiological, 
psychological and sociological factors. The sociological study of translation is 
focused on the sociological factors and social repercussions of choices made 
by translators.
5.5. Evolution of Translation System 
From the system/environment perspective, the translation system’s social dif-
ferentiation is a reentry of the difference between system and environment 
into the overall social system. Only operations that differentiate system and 
environment are at the focus of our attention. As far as observations are con-
cerned, the reentry of the system/environment relationship into the overall 
social system is needed for distinguishing between self-reference and hetero-
reference. The system’s effort to cope with the complexity of the environment 
forces the system to pinpoint those aspects of the environment that are to 
be mirrored in the system’s own inner structure. The resulting complexifica-
tion of the social system manifests itself in the creation of new subsystems 
whose function is to represent adequately the complexity of the environment 
and to render the system capable of mirroring what is ‘out there’. The struc-
tures, newly appearing as subsystems, also help optimize the intrasystemic 
communication and the system/environment interaction. The case in point 
is translation. On the one hand, translation helps the social system address 
the problem of the system’s interaction with its environment. On the other 
hand, translation facilitates interaction between various subsystems within 
the system: translation (not necessarily only verbal and not necessarily intra- 
or interlingual) is found to be an efficient means to mediate between different 
subsystems. 
The translation system claims to be the only one capable of addressing 
the problem of improbability of interaction between the overall social system 
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with its environment. Mediation is the ‘reference problem’ that translation 
solves by marking it (Luhmann 2000a: 138). The translation system takes 
the responsibility of mediating between subsystems within the system: for 
example, legal, political or art terms are translated into common parlance 
intralingually. Translation marks mediatory problems that occur both on the 
scale of intra- and intersystemic interaction. Hence, translation has a social 
function which allows it to evolve into a social subsystem in the function-
based social system. 
The above-said does not mean that translation did not exist in the pre-
function-based society. But its partial differentiation in earlier types of social 
organization was still not established as an autopoietic, operationally closed 
subsystem within society at large. Only at the period of functional differentia-
tion do subsystems, the translation subsystem included, establish themselves 
as operationally autonomous entities, because no other subsystem could play 
the role functional subsystems assume within the given social system. The 
subsystem’s dependency on other subsystems for certain functions is the con-
dition of the autonomy of social functional subsystems. Higher degrees of 
social specialization create the situation described by Luhmann in his charac-
teristically paradoxical fashion: “Specific independence depends on a consid-
erable degree of specific dependency” (2000a: 350). Concrete time references 
for the evolution of translation into a subsystem, however, vary over time and 
space and are subject to area- and period-specific studies.
6. System vs. System
Translation may be viewed as a social subsystem amongst other social subsys-
tems. When translation is considered as a subsystem amongst subsystems, we 
will refer to it as a system. Under such circumstances, as has been explained 
above, the marked homogeneity of the system is heterogenized, and subsys-
tems appear as systems to each other. 
The translation system is “equally unequal” with any other functional 
system. Functional systems have different characteristics (codes, programs, 
media). Yet, all functional systems are part of a de-centered system with no 
unilateral control: “There may be hierarchies, asymmetries, or differences in 
influence, but no part of the system can control others without itself being 
subject to control” (Luhmann 1995: 36). Systems are, thus, equal with regard 
to their inequality. “The function systems are what they are by being ‘equally’ 
distinct from one another” (Moeller 2006: 46). 
Function-systemically speaking, translation is equal with other social sys-
tems—law, economy, art, etc. How, then, do we explain the fact that translation 
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seems to be “subservient” and “submissive” to other systems? In discussing 
relations of translation with other social systems, one should keep two things 
apart—respect for the profession and understanding its functional nature. By 
nature, translation mediates what it is commissioned for mediating. In this 
sense, it is at the service of other social functional systems; hence, it follows 
directions and satisfies requirements of commissioning parties. This, howev-
er, does not mean that translation compromises its nature or stoops to behave 
obsequiously. As to the translator’s low social status, the translator is not the 
only profession that does not enjoy the respect it deserves. This, however, 
hardly can be accepted as a reason for translation not to be considered as a 
full-blown social ‘field’ or ‘system’. 
Intrasystemically, the place, which translation takes amongst other sys-
tems, is further clarified by a “form of differentiation”. “A system’s type of 
differentiation informs the system of the other systems it must expect in its 
environment” (Luhmann 2000a: 135). In the case of the function-based sys-
tem, subsystems view each other as both similar and different systems. As we 
have seen, they are similar in being different, and, to return to Luhmann’s idea 
quoted above, being independent in one respect makes them dependent in all 
other respects. According to this principle, translation is independent in the 
sense that only translation can deal with the problem of growing individuali-
zation of social functional systems by mediating between them and between 
the overall social system and the latter’s environment; no one can change the 
translation system’s operational closure. Yet, in all other respects, the transla-
tion system depends on all the other systems for solving specific problems it 
encounters. Mutatis mutandis, one may apply to translation as a social system 
what Luhmann wrote about the art system: 
[From the standpoint of the systems theory, there is no need to] advocate the 
defensive attitude that the autonomy of art ought to be upheld and protected. 
Modern art is autonomous in an operative sense. No one else does what it 
does. […] The societal nature of modern art consists in its operative closure 
and autonomy, provided that society imposes this form on all functional sys-
tems, one of which is art (2000a: 134-5).
7. System vs. Subsystem
The third type of observation is translation as a subsystem within the overall 
social system. Although there are no hierarchically organized relations be-
tween functional subsystems, their places differ in terms of directions their 
functions are exercised along the system/environment axis. Some of them are 
intrasystemically focused. They contribute to the inner communication of the 
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system. Others make the system sensitive to its environment (Luhmann 1995: 
197). Although translation is used within the social system, its most promi-
nent location is on the boundary of the system. Translation and similar social 
subsystems may be compared to ears or eyes. Translation informs the system 
of what is happening in the environment. As a boundary phenomenon, trans-
lation opens the system to the environment and the environment to the sys-
tem. Yet, translation does not carry things from inside outside and vice versa 
indiscriminately. Rather, translation always filtrates: it renders certain things 
and does not render or change other things. In such cases, translation closes, 
if partially, the system for the environment or the environment for the system.
In contrast to other social subsystems, translation may seem not well 
formed or compactly located in the social system. The elusive, protean nature 
of translation, which is described in different ways—as translation’s evanescent 
nature, as translation’s being less organized than other subsystems—results in 
diffuseness of translation as a social structure. However, this diffuseness is 
hardly surprising if we take into account the mediating nature of translation. 
Translation is, as it were, hidden behind interacting parties. Translation may 
contribute to creating new social formations (or Bourdieusian fields), remain-
ing seemingly shapeless. However, even in such elusiveness, one may well 
notice what inevitably characterizes translation: it is always located at the bor-
derline of the interacting systems. This is its operational hallmark. Therefore, 
diffuseness of translation should not distract us from the important social-
systemic characteristic of translation: it is a boundary phenomenon. 
Different subsystems within the system develop different relations with 
one another. The system develops different relations with the environment 
in different periods of its history. Certain relations may require catalytically 
involved agents (a process is optimized when a catalytic element is present); 
certain relations cannot take place unless a certain agent is at work. As a 
boundary phenomenon, translation often becomes such catalytic agent influ-
encing social processes. Translation may introduce new ideas into the inner 
communication of the system and activate what is there in the society but 
not fully manifested or developed. Sometimes, translation may become the 
only means of influencing a relation between interacting social structures. 
In such cases, translation becomes a conditio sine qua non of unfolding social 
processes.
8. Structural couplings and Interpenetration
Translation as a social subsystem is in the relationship of structural coupling 
with other social subsystems when it mediates between them. For example, 
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when a legal document is translated from one language into another, trans-
lation mediates (1) between two linguistic systems and (2) two social sys-
tems. These two types of systemic interactions are structural couplings. 
When translation is carried out, certain legal responsibilities on the part of 
the translator(s) are imposed. Translation enters structural coupling with the 
legal subsystem. These are different types of interactions: linguistic and the-
matic. The latter is the irritation of the translation subsystem by the legal 
system’s code (legal/non-legal). Both, however, are temporary. 
Structural couplings are different from another type of intersystemic in-
volvements of translation. When we consider the psychic system’s involve-
ment with translation, we deal with an interaction of permanent nature. The 
legal system may or may not influence translation; the translator’s psychol-
ogy influences translation all the time. The permanent and inevitable inter-
action of translation with other systems is interpenetration. To emphasize, 
neither structural couplings, nor interpenetration exercise effect-causality on 
translation.
9. observation: further considerations
In the de-centered modern society with no unilateral control, social systems 
have to have another mechanism of keeping themselves together. They do 
this by means of observation. In SST, the concept of observation is defined 
as handling distinctions in order to indicate one side of the form and not the 
other (Spencer Brown 1969; Luhmann 1995: 36; 2000a: 59). The form is thus 
divided into ‘marked’ and ‘unmarked’ states—system and environment. The 
marking is carried out according to a distinction by which the system distin-
guishes itself from ‘everything else’. By distinguishing itself, the system indi-
cates itself. Observing distinctions and indicating them is crucial for the sys-
tem’s autopoiesis. Observation occurs at every level of the autopoietic system: 
at the level of the overall system and at the level of subsystems. In this section 
I will concentrate on aspects of the translation subsystem’s observation and 
examine which of them help us show translation as an autopoietic system.
9.1. Self-Observation
The self-observation of social systems does not necessarily presuppose a con-
scious effort. Self-observation may introduce the system/environment distinc-
tion into the system at the basic level. Self-observation enables the system 
to constitute itself through distinguishing itself from the environment. “Self-
observation is thus the operational factor in autopoiesis, because for elements 
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to be reproduced, it must be guaranteed that they are reproduced as elements 
of the system and not as anything else” (Luhmann 1995: 37). 
In application to translation, the ‘marked’ state will be translation itself as 
opposed to anything else. For example, translation can be “profiled against its 
original,” “against non-translated texts” or “against other translations” (Her-
mans 2007a: 120). Translation in a broader semiotic sense may be juxtaposed 
with other forms of semiosis. Thus, translation reproduces itself as a certain 
type of system with particular distinctions. 
9.2. First- and Second-Order Observations
Self-observation of the system may be a complex, ‘double-decked’ proce-
dure: direct or an observation of observations. The first type of observation 
is aimed at what is observed; whereas the second—at how what is observed 
is observed. The second type of observation may be replicated ad infinitum: a 
second-order observation observes a first-order observation, at the same time 
the first second-order observation may be observed by a third-order observa-
tion, the latter by yet another and so on. Does it mean that we deal not only 
with the first- and second-order observations, but also with third- and fourth-
order observations? No, because what at stake is whether a what or a how is 
observed. The first-order observation observes the what; the second-, third-, 
fourth-order observations observe other observations and, thus, they observe 
the how of observation. Therefore, there are two types of observation. 
The first-order observation is the practice of translating. For example, any 
translational communication manifests its meditating nature in contrast to 
the mediated nature of other parties involved in TCE. “In this kind of obser-
vation, the distinction between distinction and indication is not thematized. 
The gaze remains fixed on the object” (Luhmann 2000a: 61). The first-order 
observation focuses on what it observes, experiences. It is satisfied with mini-
mal information. Only exceptionally, when puzzled by some things, the first-
order observation may look for explanations, but its capacity to process this 
extra information is still limited. “The first-order observer lives in a world 
that seems both probable and true [wahr-scheinlich]” (ibid.: 62). Did not Luh-
mann perfectly portrait practice-oriented translators or students sometimes 
waging a veritable war against translation theory? 
Such limited worldview broadens considerably at the level of second-
order observation when “the observation indicates that the observation oc-
curs as observation, that it must use a distinction, and perhaps even what 
kind of distinction it must use. […T]he second-order observer notices the 
improbability [Unwahrscheinlichkeit] of first-order observation” (ibid.: 61-2). 
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Eventually, such an approach leads to creating a field of study trying to ex-
plain how the observed improbability, however, happens to be probable and 
even normal. William Rasch summarized Luhmann’s view on this problem as 
follows:
[A] discipline can be defined not by what it studies but by the constitutive 
question it asks, and that question […] creates its field of study by positing 
a given, the improbability of which it is assigned to investigate. The social 
scientist asks, “How is social order possible?” The form of the question, ac-
cording to Luhmann, is naïve, not skeptical, so that it may point to the real 
world, which has concretized possibilities. In other words, it suppresses the 
moment of skepticism in order to constitute an entity, called social order, 
capable of being investigated. At the same time, it expresses a moment of 
wonder. It is framed as a question of the form “How is—order possible?” pre-
cisely to presuppose the obvious in order to register the “miraculous” nature 
of the obvious. (2000: 48-9.)
It is in this type of “disciplinary question” that the origin of the translation 
theory should be looked for, because au fond translation theory is a second-
order observation. (There is another aspect of the second-order observation 
as far as translation is concerned. Translation is intrinsically a second-order 
observer because, as the mediator, it observes observations of the mediated 
parties. This aspect is explained in Hermans 2007a: 126-30.) 
A brief comment on the level of abstractness of the concept ‘observation’ 
would not be amiss in connection with the question posed in the title of 
this article. In an interview, when asked what the advantage of widening the 
concept of observation to an extent surpassing consciousness was, Luhmann 
answered that this allowed him to theorize society as a self-observing system 
(Rasch 2000: 175-6). Social system devoid of consciousness is also capable of 
observing, hence, it can be described as an autopoietic system. This is true 
about any social system, including translation. 
Observation has two major characteristics: “the simultaneity of distinc-
tion and indication (keeping an eye on the other side) and their recursive 
networking with prior and subsequent observations, which, for their part, 
must also be distinguishing indications” (Luhmann 2000a: 61). Both char-
acteristics are seen in translation described as a social system. Translation 
distinguishes itself as the ‘marked’ state from everything ‘unmarked’ (Her-
mans 2007a: 119-20). It also recursively interconnects communication events 
which can be defined as translational. 
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9.3. Evolution: from First-Order Observation to Second-Order Observation
Now that we have considered the concept of observation in detail, yet another 
point may be added about the evolution of the translation system. The evolu-
tion may be presented as a move from first-order observation to second-order 
observation as was noted by Hermans (2007a: 130-6). Indeed, the translation 
system’s emancipation from other social subsystems’ influence started with 
formulating laws of translation, which are nothing less than a development of 
observations of how translation handles its distinctions as compared to other 
social activities. Hermans focused on verbal translation. Yet, this principle 
may be applied not only to verbal translation. Itamar Even-Zohar broadened 
the scope of studying translation to embrace other types of transfer (1990: 73-
4). The translation system was viewed by him as belonging to a larger class of 
phenomena. This insight has contributed to the evolution of the translation 
system because it has added yet another facet of the second-order observation 
of translation. 
10. conclusion
In the present article, I have attempted to answer the question if translation 
could be described as a system. Translation has its autopoiesis and self-organ-
ization. I have pointed out that despite the fact that translation is a diffused 
social phenomenon and is often neglected as a second-rank activity, it does 
manifest itself as a phenomenon endowed with the capacity to observe, that 
is, to handle distinctions. Therefore, translation may be said to be an auto-
poietic system with its own nature—mediation. Translation communication 
events are complex events composed of the mediated and mediating parties. 
Not infrequently, such specificity of TCEs raises doubts if translation should 
be regarded as a social system in its own right. I have tried to show that such 
doubts have little ground. 
As a system, translation may be observed on different scales: (1) as a sys-
tem vs. environment; (2) as a social system amongst other social systems; 
and (3) as a subsystem within the social system. Translation forms structural 
couplings and interpenetrations with other systems, yet in this interactional 
openness, it remains an operational closure with its own first- and second-
order observations. Thus, translation has all the characteristics of an auto-
poietic social system.
The present article is but a cursory outline of a complex problem which, 
no doubt, deserves a much more detailed consideration. My goal has by no 
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means been to exhaust the subject; rather I have shown a rich potential of SST 
for translation students. 
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